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INTRODUCTION 
 
In Crawford v. Washington,1 the Supreme Court jettisoned a quarter-
century of Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause jurisprudence by 
announcing the death of Ohio v. Roberts2 and its progeny. The Court 
announced that its new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was 
in keeping with the “original understanding” of the Sixth Amendment.3 
Under the new regime, a prosecutor cannot offer “testimonial” hearsay 
against a criminal defendant unless the declarant is unavailable and the 
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.4 
As the Crawford Court intimated was likely, the Court subsequently 
held in Whorton v. Bockting that the admission of “nontestimonial” 
hearsay does not raise any Confrontation Clause problems whatsoever.5 
Despite the tremendous importance of distinguishing “testimonial” 
hearsay from “nontestimonial” hearsay in the new system, the Crawford 
majority chose to “leave for another day any effort to spell out a 
                                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor, University of Missouri School of Law. I thank Professor Richard 
D. Friedman for taking the time to write such a robust response to my Article and the Florida 
Law Review for finding room for his piece and this reply. Further, I thank colleagues who took 
the time to read an earlier draft of this Essay. 
 1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 2. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 3. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (heeding suggestions to “revise [the Court’s] doctrine to 
reflect more accurately the original understanding of the Clause”); id. at 52 n.3 (disputing 
arguments made by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote separately, that the majority opinion 
misconstrued the “original meaning of the Sixth Amendment”). 
 4. Id. at 68. 
 5. 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007). 
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comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”6 
In the decade since Crawford declared “testimony” to be the 
touchstone of the Confrontation Clause, courts—from the humblest 
criminal trial court to the Supreme Court itself—have struggled with 
two problems. First, defining “testimonial” has proven difficult. Second, 
in certain cases, the results of defining “testimonial” as Crawford would 
seem to require have proven unappealing. Justice Antonin Scalia, the 
author of the majority opinion in Crawford and the most vocal 
cheerleader of its new doctrine, has consequently had trouble 
maintaining a majority of Justices for what would seem to be 
straightforward applications of the opinion.7 Professor Richard D. 
Friedman is troubled by this fact. I am not. 
The difficulties confronting Justice Scalia should not surprise 
observers of the so-called “originalist” project. A continuing—and, at 
least in my opinion, unsolvable—problem with a system of 
constitutional interpretation based on “original meaning” or “original 
understanding” is that reasonable persons can disagree about what 
originalist theory commands in nearly any particular case. The U.S. 
Constitution was written some time ago, and the contemporary meaning 
(or understanding, or whatever) of its key phrases is obscure to modern 
readers. The problem becomes especially acute when judges and law 
clerks with little to no training as historians practice originalism. And 
the acute problem becomes dire indeed when judges with strong 
ideological commitments in particular cases practice originalism.8 The 
recent decision in Shelby County v. Holder is among the most vivid 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. The problems with this choice were apparent at the time. 
See id. at 75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens 
of thousands of state prosecutors need answers as to what beyond the specific kinds of 
‘testimony’ the Court lists [as examples of ‘testimonial’ hearsay] is covered by the new rule. 
They need them now, not months or years from now.” (citation omitted)). 
 7. See, e.g., Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2709–10 (2011) (applying the 
Crawford doctrine to surrogate analyst testimony with divisive results). 
 8. Compare, for example, Justice Scalia’s vote in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598, 615 (2000) (holding that gender-motivated violence had only an “attenuated” effect on 
interstate commerce and that a federal right of action for victims was beyond the Commerce 
Clause power of Congress), with his concurring opinion in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 35 
(2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (holding that Congress could criminalize, under its Commerce 
Clause power, the intrastate, homegrown production and medical use of marijuana). A similar 
comparison could be made between his votes in Raich and in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2642 (2012) (concerning the health care 
insurance mandate). Consider also his vote in Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 224 
(1995), in which he joined an opinion claiming that the Fifth Amendment (ratified in 1791) 
prohibited most racial discrimination by the federal government. 
2
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illustrations of the phenomenon.9 A general critique of originalism is 
beyond the scope of this brief reply Essay; I will focus henceforth on 
the particular problems with the Crawford doctrine. 
I.  HOW IS “TESTIMONIAL” HEARSAY DEFINED? 
Absent a definition of “testimonial,” Crawford lacks coherence. An 
evaluation of the Crawford doctrine therefore required some patience. 
For example, how would the new regime treat recordings of 911 calls? 
What about lab reports with absent authors? Autopsies? What if, say, 
police find a mortally wounded man in a gas station parking lot and ask 
him about the shooter, who remains at large? As the Court wrestled with 
these questions, it revealed that the definition of “testimonial” might be 
no more predictable than the definition of a “firmly rooted” hearsay 
exception. 
In Williams v. Illinois,10 the Court considered the admissibility of a 
lab report stating that the DNA profile of blood taken from a rape 
defendant matched the profile of semen taken from the victim’s vaginal 
swabs.11 The result was a mess. Justice Samuel Alito wrote the primary 
opinion (for himself and three other Justices, two of whom were part of 
the Crawford majority)12 and concluded that the lab report was 
nontestiminial.13 Justice Clarence Thomas provided the fifth vote for 
“nontestimonial,” using a definition of the term shared by no other 
justice.14 Writing for herself and three other Justices, Justice Elena 
Kagan dissented, arguing that under Crawford and subsequent 
Confrontation Clause cases, “this is an open-and-shut case.”15 Justice 
                                                                                                                     
 9. See 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013) (applying the previously irrelevant principle of 
“equal sovereignty” to the Voting Rights Act of 1965). For a thorough discussion of how 
principled originalism is inconsistent with the Shelby County majority, see Brief Amici Curiae 
of Constitutional Law Scholars and Constitutional Accountability Center in Support of 
Respondents at 14, Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96), 2013 WL 
432960, at *4–14; see also Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2632–52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (providing 
additional historical background on the intent of the framers of the Fifteenth Amendment and 
Congress’s passage and continued reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act). 
 10. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
 11. Id. at 2227. 
 12. Justices Breyer and Kennedy joined both the Alito opinion in Williams and the 
majority in Crawford. Id.; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 37 (2004). Also joining was 
Chief Justice Roberts, who, like Justice Alito, was not on the Court when it decided Crawford. 
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2227. 
 13. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228. 
 14. See id. at 2259–60 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[N]o 
other Justice joins [Thomas’s] opinion or subscribes to the test he offers.”). 
 15. Id. at 2264–65 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 
2705, 2714 n.6 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.) (offering a definition of “testimonial”—for herself and 
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Kagan noted as well that because Justice Thomas—for reasons different 
than those of the dissenters—“reject[ed] every aspect of [the plurality’s] 
reasoning and every paragraph of its explication,” Justice Alito’s 
opinion is more like a dissent than a plurality for purposes of setting 
forth current Confrontation Clause law.16 Two members of the 
Crawford majority, Justices Ginsburg and Scalia, joined Justice Kagan 
in her dissent.17 In sum, as far as lab reports go, it remains difficult to 
define “testimonial” nearly ten years after Crawford. 
In Michigan v. Bryant,18 the Supreme Court considered the 
admission against a murder defendant of statements made by the victim 
to police.19 The victim, being dead, was not available for cross-
examination, nor had he survived long enough for Bryant’s counsel to 
conduct a prior deposition.20 Basic Crawford doctrine accordingly 
provides that if the victim’s statements to police were testimonial, the 
Confrontation Clause forbids their use.21 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Sotomayor held that under the circumstances—the victim was 
near death, and the police sought information from him to find the 
missing shooter—the “primary purpose” of the police questioning was 
responding to an “ongoing emergency,” not acquiring evidence for a 
prosecution.22 The majority therefore deemed the challenged statements 
nontestimonial.23 Justice Scalia lamented, “[T]oday’s opinion distorts 
our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in a shambles.”24 
Justice Scalia is correct that post-Crawford Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence is confusing at best. Even summarizing the current 
blackletter doctrine in an intelligible manner is a complex undertaking. 
For example, the evidence law casebook that I assign issued a new 
edition in December 2012, and it incorporated voluminous Sixth 
Amendment materials that in recent years had appeared in 
                                                                                                                     
three other Justices—similar to that set forth in Justice Kagan’s dissent in Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 
2266). 
 16. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 17. Id. at 2264. Also joining was Justice Sotomayor, who, like Justice Kagan, was not on 
the Court when Crawford was decided. Id. 
 18. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
 19. Id. at 1150. 
 20. See id. 
 21. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004). For procedural reasons decided 
under Michigan state law, the Supreme Court in Bryant did not address a potential “dying 
declaration” exception to Crawford. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1151 n.1. 
 22. Id. at 1156–57, 1162–65. 
 23. Id. at 1150, 1166. 
 24. Id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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supplements.25 Excluding the introductory material describing the pre-
Crawford world, the Confrontation Clause section now spans 100 
pages.26 Subsections have titles such as “Cracks in the Crawford 
Coalition” and “Firm Footholds and the Confrontation Flowchart.”27 
The Crawford majority acknowledged that its new doctrine would 
“cause interim uncertainty.”28 The accuracy of that statement depends 
upon a generous definition of “interim.” 
II.  HOW SHOULD “TESTIMONIAL” HEARSAY BE DEFINED? 
Professor Friedman is “not happy” with the results of Williams and 
Bryant.29 He is also disappointed by Davis v. Washington,30 in which 
the Court held that statements to police officers accusing someone of a 
crime are not always testimonial.31 If the statement is made primarily to 
resolve an ongoing emergency, then the Crawford doctrine does not 
prohibit admission against a criminal defendant.32 Professor Friedman’s 
preferred holding—“that a statement to a known police officer accusing 
another of a crime is per se testimonial”33—would certainly be simpler 
to administer than the rule fashioned in Davis and its companion case, 
Hammon v. Indiana. Indeed, the dispute in Michigan v. Bryant between 
Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion and Justice Scalia’s pained 
dissent largely concerned a disagreement about the proper application of 
Davis.34 
One problem with Professor Friedman’s suggested per se rule is that 
it would lead to a highly unpleasant result in Davis. Specifically, the 
panicked 911 call by Michelle McCottry, a domestic assault victim35—
which plainly would have been admissible under Ohio v. Roberts 
because it falls within the “firmly rooted” hearsay exceptions for 
                                                                                                                     
 25. See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE vii (3d ed. 2013) (explaining that “with confrontation 
caselaw in disarray,” among other reasons, the book’s size has swelled despite the author’s best 
intentions). 
 26. See id. 594–694. 
 27. Id. at 624, 674 (“[W]ith so little certainty about the role of reliability in confrontation 
caselaw, it is useful to plot patches of firm ground.”). 
 28. 541 U.S. 36, 68 n.10 (2004). 
 29. See Richard D. Friedman, The Mold that Shapes Hearsay Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 433, 
441 (2014). 
 30. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 31. Id. at 822. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Friedman, supra note 29, at 441 n.50. 
 34. See 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (majority opinion) (quoting Davis in opening paragraph 
while announcing holding); id. at 1168–69 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis extensively 
and arguing that “[i]nstead of clarifying the law, the Court makes itself the obfuscator of last 
resort”). 
 35. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817–18. 
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excited utterances and present sense impressions36—would become 
inadmissible. Now sometimes letting a few criminals off the hook is the 
price we pay for constitutional liberties. But one can easily understand 
the hesitance among certain Justices to hold that their newfangled 
Confrontation Clause doctrine means that Mr. Davis walks.37 Their 
hesitance is especially understandable because the purported originalist 
reasoning in Crawford is hotly contested.38 It is one thing to say, “This 
rule may not seem perfect, especially in this case, but it’s required by 
the Constitution, obedience to which is essential to the rule of law.” It is 
another to say, “I’m not certain that the Constitution requires this rule, 
but it serves good purposes and generally has positive effects—for 
example, it mostly keeps out unreliable evidence and mostly lets in 
reliable evidence—so we should tolerate the bad result in this specific 
case as a price for keeping a generally good rule.” It seems to me quite 
different to say, “I’m not certain that the Constitution requires this rule, 
and I’m also not sure that it generally has positive effects, but we should 
tolerate a bad result in this case to preserve the rule regardless.” 
If one is a principled originalist, willing to take the Constitution as it 
comes and always obey its original meaning, at least that’s an ethos. But 
there are no Supreme Court Justices who match that description.39 
Every Justice—in my mind, quite sensibly—recognizes the problems 
with originalism. In the first place, the doctrine often cannot provide 
much guidance because the historical sources are so obscure and our 
modern nation so different from that of the founding and reconstruction 
generations. Second, the results of principled originalism would 
occasionally be so offensive to widely shared beliefs about core 
American values that no one could stomach them.40 For example, in 
                                                                                                                     
 36. FED. R. EVID 803(1)–(2); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 827 (1990) (listing “excited 
utterances or statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment” as examples of 
reliable hearsay not barred by Roberts). 
 37. Nearly the entire Court joined the Davis majority opinion, which was written by 
Justice Scalia. Justice Thomas wrote separately, concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part. Davis, 547 U.S. at 815. 
 38. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in Crawford’s 
“Cross-Examination Rule”: A Reply to Mr. Kry, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 557, 557–58 (2007); 
Thomas Y. Davies, Not “The Framers’ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay 
Evidence Refutes the Crawford–Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the Original 
Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 354 (2007); Randolph N. Jonakait, “Witnesses” in 
the Confrontation Clause: Crawford v. Washington, Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 
79 TEMP. L. REV. 155, 157 (2006); Daniel Shaviro, The Confrontation Clause Today in Light of 
its Common Law Background, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 337, 340–41 (1991). 
 39. Justice Clarence Thomas may be the lone exception, especially in recent years. 
 40. If nothing else, Supreme Court nominees accurately asserting certain originalist 
positions at Senate hearings would have trouble winning confirmation. 
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Bolling v. Sharpe,41 which was decided the same day as Brown v. Board 
of Education,42 the Supreme Court prevented the District of Columbia 
from running segregated public schools.43 Personally, I believe that 
Bolling cannot be justified by an appeal to the original meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment, and I find even less plausible theories that the 
Fourteenth Amendment (while talking exclusively about the states) 
somehow silently amended the Fifth Amendment’s restrictions on the 
federal government. Because I am not an originalist, I have the luxury 
of not caring. Bolling’s result is obviously correct, and that’s that.44 If 
your constitutional theory rejects Bolling, that means something is 
wrong with your theory, not the Court’s opinion.45 
Recall that in 2007, the Court stated explicitly that the Crawford 
doctrine is not concerned with the reliability of evidence. As the 
unanimous Court stated in Whorton v. Bockting: 
Crawford overruled Roberts because Roberts was 
inconsistent with the original understanding of the meaning 
of the Confrontation Clause, not because the Court reached 
the conclusion that the overall effect of the Crawford rule 
would be to improve the accuracy of factfinding in criminal 
trials. Indeed, in Crawford we recognized that even under 
the Roberts rule, this Court had never specifically approved 
the introduction of testimonial hearsay 
statements. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the overall 
effect of Crawford with regard to the accuracy of 
factfinding in criminal cases is not easy to assess.46 
The Court continued: 
[W]hatever improvement in reliability Crawford produced 
in this respect must be considered together with Crawford’s 
elimination of Confrontation Clause protection against the 
admission of unreliable out-of-court nontestimonial 
statements. Under Roberts, an out-of-court nontestimonial 
statement not subject to prior cross-examination could not 
be admitted without a judicial determination regarding 
                                                                                                                     
 41. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 43. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500. 
 44. “In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining 
racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would 
impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.” Id. 
 45. Consider also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that 
antimiscegenation laws are unconstitutional). I will stand with Mr. & Mrs. Loving over the 
original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment every time. 
 46. 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007) (citation omitted). 
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reliability. Under Crawford, on the other hand, the 
Confrontation Clause has no application to such statements 
and therefore permits their admission even if they lack 
indicia of reliability.47 
Professor Friedman has no problem with the Court’s lack of concern 
with reliability. Responding to my invocation of Dyer—the mariner 
who testified against Walter Raleigh, repeating the out-of-court 
statement of an anonymous Portuguese gentleman implicating Raleigh 
in treason—Professor Friedman is “not troubled.”48 
More recent cases reveal that at least some of the Justices feel 
differently; they cannot accept that their new Confrontation Clause 
doctrine cares not a whit about the reliability of evidence admitted 
against criminal defendants. In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, Justice 
Kennedy wrote a dissent (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Breyer and Alito), in which he lamented that under Crawford, states 
“often are foreclosed now from contributing to the formulation and 
enactment of rules that make trials fairer and more reliable.”49 In 
Michigan v. Bryant, Justice Sotomayor wrote for the majority 
(consisting of herself and the four dissenters from Bullcoming), “In 
making the primary purpose determination [which controls whether the 
statement is testimonial and therefore whether potentially affected by 
the Confrontation Clause], standard rules of hearsay, designed to 
identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant.”50 Other opinions 
have expressed similar interest in reviving reliability as a part of 
Confrontation Clause doctrine.51 
                                                                                                                     
 47. Id. at 420. 
 48. Friedman, supra note 29, at 458 (“I acknowledge that under my approach, the 
confrontation right would probably not exclude evidence of the statement—but I do not regard 
this as troublesome.”). 
 49. 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Whether those statutes could 
provide sufficient indicia of reliability and other safeguards to comply with the Confrontation 
Clause as it should be understood is, to be sure, an open question. The point is that the States 
cannot now participate in the development of this difficult part of the law.”). 
 50. 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011). 
This logic is not unlike that justifying the excited utterance exception in 
hearsay law. Statements ‘relating to a startling event or condition made while 
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition,’ are considered reliable because the declarant, in the excitement, 
presumably cannot form a falsehood. 
Id. at 1157 (citation omitted) (quoting pre-restyled FED. R. EVID. 803(2)). 
 51. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2243 (2012) (plurality opinion) 
(“[R]eliability is a salient characteristic of a statement that falls outside the reach of the 
Confrontation Clause.”); id. at 2252 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[S]hould the defendant provide 
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To sum up: Crawford’s constitutional underpinnings are 
questionable, it sometimes excludes reliable evidence (previously 
admissible under prior Confrontation Clause decisions) that might help 
convict guilty defendants, and it sometimes admits unreliable evidence 
(heretofore barred under prior Confrontation Clause decisions) at 
American criminal trials. Further, lower courts have trouble applying it 
because the Supreme Court cannot agree on a meaning of “testimonial.” 
Is it any wonder that the Justices have attempted to evade the doctrine? 
III.  NOW WHAT? 
I have argued that under Ohio v. Roberts, the Confrontation Clause 
“saved us” from the admission of certain unreliable evidence against 
criminal defendants that is now admissible.52 The Supreme Court has 
stated that if hearsay is nontestimonial, then a lack of reliability does not 
present a Confrontation Clause problem post-Crawford.53 And it seems 
that while the Court has nonetheless recently turned its attention once 
again to reliability, so far that gaze has served only to define certain 
purportedly reliable evidence as nontestimonial and accordingly 
admissible. It has not yet been employed to deem unreliable evidence 
testimonial and accordingly inadmissible. This doctrinal fudging—that 
somehow exclusively assists the prosecution—is perhaps the inevitable 
result of the Court adopting a criminal procedural rule that occasionally 
prevents the conviction of guilty defendants. Like the Miranda Rule and 
the warrant requirement,54 the Crawford doctrine invites meddling by 
Justices unhappy with the results in particular cases. 
Because the Court is highly unlikely to adopt per se rules enshrining 
Professor Friedman’s vision of the Confrontation Clause into 
constitutional law, continued attention should be devoted to the 
admission under Crawford of unreliable hearsay against criminal 
defendants. The Justices have shown their willingness to tinker with the 
definition of “testimonial” when it allows the conviction of the 
                                                                                                                     
good reason to doubt the laboratory’s competence or the validity of its accreditation, then the 
alternative safeguard of reliability would no longer exist and the Constitution would entitle 
defendant to Confrontation Clause protection.”). 
 52. See Ben Trachtenberg, Confronting Coventurers: Coconspirator Hearsay, Sir Walter 
Raleigh, and the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1669, 1700–03 
(2012). 
 53.  See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007). 
 54. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382–86 (2010) (creating a broad 
presumption of waiver of Miranda rights); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984) 
(creating a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases); New 
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984) (creating a “public safety exception” to Miranda 
Rule); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (creating an “inevitable discovery” 
exception). 
9
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apparently guilty.55 With the originalist façade cast aside, it seems only 
fair that they consider glosses on the Crawford doctrine that would 
decrease the likelihood of convicting the innocent. Such reconsideration 
would presumably require the rejection of its holding that 
nontestimonial hearsay never implicates the Confrontation Clause,56 
although perhaps sufficiently creative Justices could find a way to 
define certain unreliable hearsay as “testimonial” despite the lack of any 
motive to assist prosecutors when the hearsay was uttered. 
Most coventurer hearsay—also called “lawful joint venture” 
hearsay—will have a difficult time fitting into any plausible definition 
of “testimonial.” The Crawford majority explicitly stated that its new 
Confrontation Clause theory would not affect evidence admitted under 
the coconspirator statement exception to the hearsay rule.57 The lawful 
joint venture interpretation of the coconspirator statement exception 
posits that the word “conspiracy” in Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(2)(E) refers broadly to all joint enterprises, whether legal or 
illegal.58 I have attacked this revisionist interpretation of the exception 
in some depth;59 I will not revisit the sins of coventurer hearsay in this 
space. I will, however, thank Professor Friedman for agreeing with my 
“view that this doctrine extends the [coconspirator statement exception] 
beyond its intended meaning.”60 Regardless of whatever light the lawful 
                                                                                                                     
 55. Instead of saying “this hearsay evidence is testimonial, but prosecutors can use it 
anyway,” the Court has massaged the definition of “testimonial” so as not to include certain 
evidence that might appear “testimonial” under a straightforward reading of Crawford. The 
result is the same: The evidence is not barred by the Sixth Amendment. 
 56. See Whorton, 549 U.S. at 420 (contrasting how “[u]nder Roberts an out-of-court 
nontestimonial statement not subject to prior cross-examination could not be admitted without a 
judicial determination regarding reliability,” but “[u]nder Crawford . . . the Confrontation 
Clause has no application to such statements and therefore permits their admission even if they 
lack indicia of reliability”). The problem created by Whorton mirrors that identified in the 
dissent in Bullcoming. 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Whereas 
Crawford and Bullcoming discourage states from developing reliable systems for the creation of 
certain kinds of evidence because even reliable “testimonial” evidence will be excluded, 
Whorton tells states that certain evidence (i.e., “nontestimonial” hearsay) is freely admissible 
despite its unreliability. Whorton, 549 U.S. at 420. 
 57. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56, 59 n.9. 
 58. See Trachtenberg, supra note 52, at 1685–95. 
 59. See Brief for Professors of Evidence as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2–4, 
Elashi v. United States, No. 11-1390 (June 20, 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 525 (2012); Ben 
Trachtenberg, Coconspirators, “Coventurers,” and the Exception Swallowing the Hearsay Rule, 
61 HASTINGS L.J. 581, 583 (2010). 
 60. Friedman, supra note 29, at 463. This seems as good a place as any to assuage 
Professor Friedman’s concern that when the going gets tough for the prosecution, I wish to 
“bend principle and admit evidence that would otherwise be unacceptable.” Id. at 456. When I 
write that “necessity” is the real justification for the coconspirator statement exception, I am 
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joint venture theory shines on Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, the 
revisionist take on the coconspirator statement exception is simply 
erroneous statutory interpretation—a clear misreading of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. 
After this agreement, we part company as to the significance of the 
new hearsay doctrine and its relationship to new Confrontation Clause 
doctrine. Rather than redefine the hearsay rule to better match a vision 
of the Confrontation Clause that even post-Crawford Justices have 
recently found unpalatable, those concerned with the admission of 
unreliable evidence against criminal defendants may wish to turn our 
attention to strengthening the hearsay rule. For example, while I find it 
vaguely preposterous that the word “conspiracy” in Rule 801(d)(2)(E) 
has been redefined as “pretty much any joint undertaking” by multiple 
federal courts of appeal,61 the law of those circuits is what it is, not what 
I wish it to be. If the Supreme Court does not correct the errant 
interpretation of the federal coconspirator statement exception, 
Congress should amend Rule 801 to make clear that “conspiracy” 
means “conspiracy.”62 Other new (that is, not “firmly rooted”) hearsay 
exceptions prone to admitting lousy evidence (that is, evidence without 
“indicia of reliability”) may also justify amendments to federal and state 
evidence rules. State legislators and judges in particular should 
remember that the U.S. Supreme Court is not the supreme arbiter of 
state evidence law. 
My concern about the admission of unreliable hearsay perhaps 
illustrates my old-fashioned thinking about evidence. Some modern 
authors argue that the hearsay rule and its jumble of exceptions are not 
worth the trouble they cause.63 This debate raises important empirical 
                                                                                                                     
describing reality, not announcing my approval. Many legal rules are grounded on theories I 
dislike. 
 61. See, e.g., United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 502 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Although 
the rule speaks of statements made in furtherance of a ‘conspiracy,’ we have recognized that 
admissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) does not turn on the criminal nature of the 
endeavor. Instead, a statement may be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) if it is made in 
furtherance of a lawful joint undertaking.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 
197, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[O]ur precedents hold that the doctrine [from Rule 801(d)(2)(E)] is 
not limited to unlawful combinations.”). 
 62. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), which exempts from the hearsay rule a 
statement “offered against an opposing party” that “was made by the party’s coconspirator 
during and in furtherance of the conspiracy,” could be amended to include the word “unlawful” 
in the phrase “in furtherance of the [unlawful] conspiracy.” Because conspiracies by their nature 
involve unlawful acts, see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“An agreement by two or 
more persons to commit an unlawful act . . . .”), this amendment would not be necessary if 
courts read the existing rule correctly. 
 63. See, e.g., Matthew Caton, Abolish the Hearsay Rule: The Truth of the Matter Asserted 
at Last, 26 ME. B.J. 126, 127 (2011) (arguing that “the perceived dangers associated with 
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questions: Is hearsay less reliable than other forms of evidence freely 
admitted in American courts? Is hearsay admitted under existing 
exceptions more reliable than other hearsay?64 Do juries overvalue 
hearsay, or do they appropriately discount it when deciding cases? The 
research of psychologists has provided valuable insights in recent years 
concerning how fact finders evaluate various sorts of evidence,65 and 
their wisdom could help advance the hearsay debate. Natural 
experiments may be possible, comparing jurisdictions that have 
maintained traditional hearsay law with those that have relaxed the rule. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, “reliability” has proven 
resilient. Respected scholars, and even a unanimous Supreme Court, 
have declared its irrelevance. Yet it keeps showing up in opinions, with 
a majority of justices having recently joined one opinion or another 
asserting its importance. Considering how much of evidence law is 
devoted to keeping unreliable evidence from juries,66 as well as 
evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by its 
unfairly prejudicial effect,67 the continued attention to reliability should 
not cause much surprise. If a new constitutional doctrine purports to 
reject reliability as a criterion for the admissibility of evidence, scholars 
and judges concerned about fair and accurate trials will prove difficult 
to convince. 
 
                                                                                                                     
hearsay evidence no longer justify the exclusion of relevant hearsay evidence in civil 
litigation”). 
 64. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)–(2) advisory committee’s note (questioning the traditional 
justification for the excited utterance exception). 
 65. See, e.g., Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors’ 
Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177 (2006) (concluding 
that jurors commonly misunderstand what makes some pieces of evidence more reliable than 
others). See generally JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO & RONALD COTTON, PICKING COTTON: 
OUR MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2009) (telling the story of a man wrongfully 
convicted of rape and the racial biases that impacted his trial before he was later exonerated by 
DNA evidence and developed a friendship with his accuser). 
 66. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702, 802, 901. 
 67. See, e.g., id. 403, 404, 411. 
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